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Do the new member states of the European Union (EU) comply with EU law even after they 
have obtained membership? The conditional incentive of EU membership has been a key 
factor in the transfer of the EU rules to the then candidate countries (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2004). After membership is no longer conditional, does compliance suffer? 
Available data on infringements of EU law suggests that post-accession compliance in the new 
member states is much better than might have been expected in view of the changing incentive 
structure. During the first five years of membership, most new members outperformed 
virtually all of the old member states (Sedelmeier 2008).  
However, is this finding borne out in a closer analysis of specific issue areas? Doubts may 
arise since the source of detecting infringements could be less developed in the new members 
than in the old members (Sedelmeier 2008: 818-19). About half of the suspected infringements 
that the Commission investigates result from complaints – by private individuals, firms, 
NGOs, etc. – but their importance as a source of detecting infringements in the new member
states is much lower. There might be a suspicion that the good performance of the new 
members might mask a higher incidence of undetected non-compliance. In-depth case studies 
are therefore necessary to complement quantitative data on cross-national variation. Indeed, 
one of the first issue-specific qualitative studies of compliance in the new members suggests
that EU directives are generally faithfully transposed into national law, but remain ‘dead 
letters’ as application and enforcement are not satisfactory (Falkner and Treib 2008; Falkner, 
Treib, and Holzleithner 2008).  
This paper contributes to the emerging research agenda on post-accession compliance in the 
EU’s post-communist member states (Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008; Schimmelfennig and
Trauner 2009 this issue; see also Sedelmeier 2010 forthcoming). It analyses pre- and post-
accession compliance with EU gender equality legislation in four new member states – the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Lithuania. These countries display variation with 
regard to the explanatory factors that this paper analyses. A comprehensive analysis of 
compliance needs to include the study of application, but the scope of this paper’s analysis is 
more modest. The paper focuses on the transposition of EU legislation into national law and 
the enforcement powers of domestic equality institutions established to support 
implementation. At the same time, it compares not only pre- and post-accession performance, 
but also takes a step towards explaining differences in transposition and enforcement 
capacities across countries and time periods.  
The following section clarifies the dependent variable of the analysis: the correct transposition 
of EU legislation on workplace equality between women and men and the enforcement powers 
of the national bodies set up to promote the implementation of gender equality legislation. 
Section three presents the explanatory factors that this paper focuses on: partisan preferences 
of governments, adjustment costs, and societal mobilisation. Section four provides an 
assessment of whether transposition in the four countries is broadly correct and of the equality 
bodies’ enforcement capacities. I do not find significant differences between post- and pre-
accession compliance. Overall compliance can be considered good in Hungary, Lithuania, and 
Slovenia, while it is considerably worse in the Czech Republic. As a first step towards 
explaining variation in legal transposition and enforcement bodies, section five uses crisp-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) to present a structured comparison of the 
configuration of explanatory conditions and compliance outcomes in the four countries, 
distinguishing between the pre- and post-accession period. The result of the analysis is that 
there are two equifinal paths towards correct transposition of EU gender equality legislation 
and strong enforcement bodies in the new members: either the absence of high adjustment 
costs, or the combination of strong social democratic governments and NGOs with special 
expertise in EU gender equality legislation. 
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With regard to the dependent variable, this paper makes three choices that narrow down the 
focus of the analysis. The first choice concerns the specific rules within the broader area of EU 
gender equality legislation. Second, the paper focuses on a narrower aspect of compliance by 
distinguishing between the legal transposition, enforcement, and the application of legislation. 
The third choice concerns the temporal distinction between the pre-accession and post-
accession period.  
2.1. EU gender equality rules: equal pay and equal treatment at work  
At the time of the accession of the post-communist new members, EU gender equality 
legislation consisted of nine different directives (four of which were consolidated in the so-
called Recast Directive of 2006). These directives include issues such as equality with regard 
to part-time work, self-employment, social security schemes, occupational pensions, the 
burden of proof in discrimination cases, protection of pregnant workers, and parental leave. In 
order to make the analysis more manageable, this paper focuses on two directives that arguably 
cover the most important provisions of EU gender equality legislation: the Equal Pay Directive 
and the Equal Treatment Directive.  
The Equal Pay Directive (75/117/EEC) provides for equal pay for the same work or work of
equal value. The Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC, amended in 2002 by Directive 
2002/73/EC) prohibits direct and indirect gender discrimination in a wide range of areas, 
including employment, promotion, and working conditions. It also introduces definitions of 
harassment and sexual harassment; guarantees victims access to judicial and/or administrative 
procedures, and compensation; provides the right for organisations to engage in judicial 
procedures on behalf of, or in support of, victims; and requires the imposition of dissuasive 
sanctions. A key innovation of Directive 2002/73 is the requirement to establish an equality 
body ‘for the promotion, analysis, monitoring and support of equal treatment.’ This body’s 
competences have to include providing independent assistance to victims of discrimination in 
pursuing complaints; conducting independent surveys; publishing reports; and making 
recommendations.  
2.2. Assessing compliance: transposition and enforcement machineries  
Compliance with EU law comprises at least two distinctive stages (see e.g. Falkner et al. 2005: 
4). The first stage is the correct (and timely) transposition of the requirements of EU law into 
national legislation. The second stage is the subsequent correct application of the rules by 
those towards they are addressed, including the enforcement of the rules by public authorities 
if the targets of the rules do not comply. The differences between these stage is also captured 
in the distinction between formal compliance or the formal adoption of rules and behavioural 
compliance or behavioural rule adoption (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 8).  
Of course for a complete assessment of compliance, an analysis of the correct application of 
legislation in practice is crucial. Even correctly transposed legislation can remain ‘dead 
letters’ (Falkner and Treib 2008; Falkner et al. 2005) if it is not applied on the ground by the 
targets of legislation and if public authorities do not take measures to enforce legislation if the 
target actors do not comply. Problems with application can be expected to be particularly 
salient in the area of gender equality – both in old and new member states – which is difficult 
to monitor. Application would need to be monitored at the level of individual firms and there 
are no readily available quantitative indicators. By same token, practical application is also 
difficult to evaluate for researchers. Although interviews reveal the existence of widespread 
application problems, it is still very difficult to establish on the basis of this information a 
comparative assessment of problems across countries, which could lend itself to an 
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focuses primarily on transposition and enforcement, and leaves an analysis of application –
which ideally should also include old member states as comparators – for follow-up research.  
With regard to transposition, the paper assesses the timely and correct transposition of the 
provisions of the EU’s equal pay and gender equal treatment directives into national law. The 
assessment whether legislation has been correctly transposed is not as straightforward as it 
may appear (as opposed to whether national transposition measures are notified in time). Even 
legal experts can disagree about whether the definition of key terms in national legislation is 
adequate. Another challenge is a comparative assessment of correct transposition. In most 
member states there are at least some shortcomings in legal transposition. For example, with 
regard to Directive 2002/73 alone, the Commission opened infringement procedures for 
incorrect transposition against 25 member states (Commission 2009: 3). This paper’s 
comparative analysis is therefore based on a qualitative assessment of relative differences in 
the extent to which legislation is broadly correct and how serious the shortcomings are, rather 
than a simple count of each instance in which national legislation is incompatible with the 
requirements of EU directives.  
In terms of enforcement, the paper analyses the institutions that were set up to enforce gender 
equality legislation. The literature on ‘Europeanisation’ identifies the existence of domestic 
institutions that provide resources for changes in line with the goals of EU legislation as 
important factors that mediate the EU’s adaptational pressure (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso
2001: 9). In the area of gender equality in particular, such institutions have been found to play 
a crucial role (Alter and Vargas 2000; Caporaso and Jupille 2001: 31-34; Conant 2001: 110-
12). These institutions include labour inspectorates or specialised courts, but of central 
importance are public bodies that have been specifically established to promote gender 
equality. While such equality bodies are considered an independent variable in analyses of the 
application of equality legislation, this paper assesses variation in the characteristics of these 
institutions across countries as part of the dependent variable. It is precisely the importance of 
such equality bodies for the enforcement and subsequent application of legislation that makes 
it necessary to analyse the characteristics of these bodies as an aspect of compliance outcomes. 
As mentioned above, Directive 2002/73 requires the member states to designate institutions to 
promote gender equality. However, its requirements with regard to the tasks and competences 
of such bodies – the conduct of independent surveys concerning discrimination, publishing
independent reports and making recommendations, as well as the provision of ‘independent 
assistance to victims of discrimination in pursuing their complaints’ – specify only minimum 
requirements. This paper therefore does not only evaluate – in terms of transposition– whether 
national equality bodies meet the minimum requirements, but also – in terms of enforcement –
the extent to which these bodies are endowed with resources beyond these minimum 
requirements.  
In terms of the three-fold classification of equality institutions by Krizsan et al. (2009: 6-7), 
enforcement powers are characteristic of ‘statutory complaint bodies’ with an investigatory, 
complaints-driven mandate and some independence from the executive, rather than of
‘equality policy machineries’ with monitoring functions within the executive, or coordinating 
and advisory ‘consultative council-type bodies’ that bring together representatives from 
different ministries and non-state actors. Apart from this broad distinction, the power of such
statutory complaints bodies can still vary considerably across countries. To assess the relative 
enforcement capacities of equality bodies, this paper focuses on the following three 
characteristics. The legal and organisational status of the institution concerns both the 
independence and the authority of an equality body. Independence increases when the body 
responds directly to parliament, rather than being part of the executive; within the executive, 
independence is higher if it is a separate ministry, or part of the prime minister’s or president’s 
office, rather than a unit within the ministry of labour or family affairs (see also Avdeyeva 
2009: 163). The authority of the equality body increases the more its competences go beyond
monitoring and advocacy, towards an ability to investigate claims, issuing binding opinions on 
discrimination cases, imposing fines on offenders (and the more significant such fines can be), 
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legal proceedings in courts on behalf of victims. A further factor is the extent to which the 
equality body has specific expertise on gender equality (see also Caporaso and Jupille 2001: 
31), rather than on other possible grounds of discrimination, such as race, ethnic origin, age, 
disability, or sexual orientation. This paper considers that an equality body has enforcement 
capacity if it has independence and if it can either adjudicate discrimination cases or has legal 
standing. In addition, it requires at least a moderate extent of specialisation, while a high 
degree of specialisation can compensate – in the margins – for shortfalls in independence and 
authority.  
2.3. Time periods: pre- and post-accession  
In order to assess whether obtaining EU membership has made a difference, the paper analyses 
compliance with EU gender equality legislation in the various countries in two distinctive 
periods. The pre-accession period starts roughly 1998/1999, after the Commission’s first 
assessments of the then candidate countries’ alignment with EU legislation - its opinion on 
their membership applications in 1997 and the first annual monitoring report at the end of 
1998. The post-accession period starts in 2004, when the countries concerned joined the EU. 
The analysis of two separate periods for each country allows us to assess whether compliance 
deteriorates after accession, and to increase the number of observations.  
Two objections could be raised against using such a distinction to disaggregate cases. One 
concern might be that compliance during the two periods consists of different activities. If the 
pre-accession period was characterised by the need to carry out formal changes to national 
legislation and their actual application became only necessary after accession, a comparison of 
compliance between the two periods would be difficult. However, it would be wrong to equate 
pre-accession compliance with transposition, and post-accession compliance with application. 
The new members indeed had to transpose the equal pay directive prior to accession, but the 
transposition deadline of the amended equal treatment directive fell into the post-accession 
phase. With regard to equal treatment, upon accession thus only the provisions of Directive 
76/207 had to be implemented, but the extensive an much more demanding provisions of 
Directive 2002/73 transposition mentioned earlier only needed to be in place in October 2005. 
A related concern might be that the two periods do not constitute independent observations of 
the outcome. Correct transposition in the pre-accession phase (t0) increases the likelihood that 
the same legislation is correctly transposed in the post-accession period (t1). However, the 
need to transpose new legislation during the post-accession phase makes it an independent 
observation, as separate transposition measures are necessary during pre- and post-accession. 
Moreover, even for legislation that was already transposed prior to accession, the maintenance 
of compliant legislation is not guaranteed.. In principle, legislation can be amended and 
dismantled. Maintaining previously transposed legislation therefore can be considered as a 
separate incidence of compliance. Although reversing correctly transposed legislation might be 
problematic in areas of the acquis communautaire, it might be particularly salient with regard 
to the enforcement capacities of the equality body, for which the acquis only specifies 
minimum requirements. In sum, while the analysis needs to be mindful that compliance in the 
post-accession period might not always be independent from the outcomes in the pre-accession 
period, a separate analysis of the pre- and post-accession periods can be justified.  
3. Explanatory conditions: government orientation, adjustment costs, and 
societal mobilisation  
Different explanatory factors matter for transposition and application respectively(1).To 
explain transposition and enforcement institutions, this paper focuses on the following three 
factors that appear particularly pertinent: the government’s ideological orientation (and its 
parliamentary strength), the costs of compliance with EU legislation, and societal mobilisation. 
The penultimate section of the paper also considers alternative explanatory factors, such as the 
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exercised by EU institutions, and national administrative capacity and coordinating structures 
for the transposition of the acquis. This section discusses the three explanatory factors that the 
paper analyses and their constellation in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, and 
Slovenia.  
3.1. Partisan preferences of the government  
While EU compliance research has started only more recently to focus on party political 
preferences of national governments (see e.g. Treib 2008: 10; Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2007; 
Linos 2007), the importance of this factor is more established in comparative studies of gender 
equality. The influence of the government’s left/right orientation on a country’s general 
compliance patterns might be less obvious, but it is arguably indeed particularly salient in 
areas of EU social policy, such as gender equality. There is ‘considerable evidence that [...] 
social democratic and labour parties are more favourably disposed to gender equality issues 
than parties to the right of the political spectrum’ (O'Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999: 202-3; 
see also Anderson 2006).  
Table 1 (below) provides an overview of the party political configuration in the four countries 
during the pre-accession and post-accession periods. I use two different indicators of the 
strength of social democratic governments. I consider a period to be characterised by a strong 
left government if social democratic parties held over 40 percent of parliamentary seats for at 
least two years, and over 66.6 percent of cabinet positions (using the cut-off point in 
Armingeon et al. 2008) in a majority government for at least two years. As Table 1 shows, 
both indicators lead to the same result for the countries and periods under consideration.  
Table 1 about here 
3.2. Adjustment costs  
The key factor emphasised by ‘enforcement’ approaches to compliance with international 
institutions are the adjustment costs that international rules impose on national governments, 
either directly or indirectly if these targets of such rules are private actors on which the 
government depends to stay in power (see e.g. Fearon 1998; Tallberg 2002: 611-12).  
One way to assess the adjustments is to focus on the institutional and policy ‘misfit’ between 
the requirements of EU legislation and the domestic level (see e.g. Börzel 2003). Under 
communism, equality between men and women was portrayed as much more advanced than in 
capitalist countries, which suggests that EU gender equality legislation should not create high 
adjustment pressures. However, this presentation is misleading. Equality might have been 
more developed in terms of female employment levels, and progressive attitudes towards 
reproductive rights, but across all the candidate countries legislation on workplace equality 
reveals major deficiencies with regard to the provisions of EU legislation. This indicator 
therefore does not capture much cross-national variation in adjustment costs.  
An indicator of the costs that the implementation of gender equality in employment imposes 
on companies is the gender pay gap. It presents the difference in average gross hourly earning, 
calculated as a percentage of men’s earnings. Caporaso and Jupille (2001) use the pay gap as 
one indicator of the ‘fit’ between EU directives and national practice. Still, it has to be used 
with caution. It is not a direct measure of the extent to which women and men receive the same 
pay for work of equal value. Part of the pay gap results from the gender segregation of the 
labour market. Women are disproportionately employed in part-time and low-paid work, and 
underrepresented in the highest paid positions in a particular occupation. Yet to the extent that 
the gender pay gap also reflects these more subtle forms discrimination, it appears suitable as a 
more general indicator of workplace discrimination – and hence of the adjustment costs that 
equal treatment involves – rather than only the lack of equal pay. On the other hand, low pay
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(e.g. Italy and Poland), the pay gap is lower than average, which may reflect the smaller 
proportion of low-skilled or unskilled women in the workforce.  
Moreover, as the figures published by Eurostat draw on unadjusted national survey data, they 
are problematic for precise cross-national comparisons. Still, the broader patterns appear 
nonetheless suitable to establish at least broader patterns of variation in the extent to which 
countries face adjustment costs. Table 2 (below) presents the pay gap in 1999 and in 2004, as 
an indicator of the adjustment costs at the beginning of the pre-accession and post-accession 
periods respectively. This paper considers the adjustment costs high if they are 4 percent or 
more above the EU average. 
Table 2 about here 
3.3. Societal mobilisation: specialised women’s NGOs  
Mobilisation by domestic groups benefitting from the rights that EU legislation bestows on 
them is a factor that has recently become more prominent in EU compliance studies (Börzel 
2003: 38–9, 53–4; 2006; Cichowski 2004; Conant 2002; Falkner et al. 2005: 36–7). The EU’s 
decentralised monitoring mechanism relies heavily on private actors at the domestic level to 
raise complaints with the Commission or to litigate in national courts if national governments 
fail to implement EU legislation (Tallberg 2002: 620-22). Comparative studies of gender 
equality also emphasise the strength and mobilisation of women’s groups as an important 
factor (Alter and Vargas 2000: 457–9; Anderson 2006; Avdeyeva 2009; Caporaso and Jupille 
2001: 25; O'Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999: 202).  
Gender equality is a hard case for the mobilisation of societal groups. As gender equality 
benefits diffuse societal interests, NGOs that promote it face a collective action problem, in 
contrast to issue areas in which the beneficiaries of EU rules are businesses. A methodological 
problem is that neither membership in women’s organisations, nor strong social movements 
promoting women’s rights might be a reliable indicator of societal capacities to mobilise for 
the implementation of EU workplace equality. Membership in women’s groups – recorded e.g. 
in the World Values Survey – does not distinguish between NGOs that aim to promote
women’s rights and leisure groups only open to women. Moreover, women’s rights 
movements might be strong, but the typical focus of their advocacy is not workplace 
discrimination, but issues such as reproductive rights or domestic violence that are outside the 
scope of EU law. This paper therefore focuses on whether a country has (in the respective 
periods) NGOs that have specialised expertise on EU law concerning gender equality at work. 
I do not attempt to determine whether there are further cross-national variation in the 
mobilisation capacities of such women’s NGOs that might result from differences in, e.g. their
funding, staffing levels and membership. Moreover, transnational linkages – such as to the 
European Commission or transnational women’s NGOs – can increase the capacity of 
domestic groups. However, where specialised women’s groups exist in East Central Europe, 
their cross-national linkages appear fairly similar, both with regard to the Commission, as well 
as concerning membership in the European Women’s Lobby and the KARAT coalition (the 
regional association of gender equality NGOs). The paper does, however, consider differences 
in the extent to which such women’s NGOs cooperate or compete for funding and influence, 
and in the quality of their links with government and equality bodies. The following sections 
present an overview of whether specialised women’s NGOs existed in the four countries, 
drawing on interviews with women’s NGOs, equality bodies, and government officials in the 
countries concerned during 2005 and 2006. Table 3 summarises these findings.  
Table 3 about here 
z In Hungary, two main NGOs have expertise in gender equality at the workplace: the 
Women's Rights Association (NANE) and the Hungarian Women’s Foundation 
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with domestic violence, both organisations have specialised expertise on EU workplace 
equality legislation, run projects in this area, and engage in policy advocacy. MONA 
also conducted the Hungarian study for the Open Society Institute (OSI) report on the 
implementation of EU gender equality legislation (Krizsan and Pap 2005). Although the 
two organisations potentially compete, it appears that in practice their activities are 
complementary and their relationship is cooperative. The formulation of common 
positions on legislative changes under the umbrella of the Hungarian Women’s Lobby 
works well. Some policy-makers suggest that women’s groups in Hungary are 
fragmented, yet this observation appears to hold not so much for the relationship 
between the main NGOs working on gender equality, but to their critical attitude 
towards the equality body, in which their perceive gender equality concerns 
inadequately represented.  
z In the Czech Republic, the most active women’s NGO with specialised expertise on 
gender equality at work is ‘Gender Studies o.p.s.’, founded in 1992. Its activities include 
the publication of a ‘shadow report’ on equal treatment (Pavlik 2004), compiled by a 
number of individuals from the non-governmental and academic sectors with funding 
from the Open Society Fund Prague. The organisation was initially reluctant to support 
such a confrontational strategy of shaming the government over shortcomings in the 
implementation of EU gender equality legislation. Disagreement over such a strategy 
also caused some friction between women’s groups. Otherwise, however, relations 
between women’s groups are cooperative, although cooperation is mainly ad hoc 
despite the creation of umbrella associations such as the Association for Equal 
Opportunities and the Czech Women’s Lobby.  
z In Lithuania, two NGOs have specialised expertise on gender equality at work. The 
Women’s Issues Information Centre (WIIC) was created in 1996 and the Centre for
Equality Advancement (CEA) in 2003, continuing the work that the Open Society Fund-
Lithuania Women’s programme had carried out from 1997. However, workplace
equality is not a main concern for the WIIC, and although the CEA carried out the 
Lithuanian study for the OSI’s monitoring of the implementation of EU workplace 
equality (Mackeviciute 2005), its main focus with regard to EU gender equality 
legislation has otherwise been on parental leave and the promotion of paternity leave.  
z Slovenia stands out among the four countries for not having an NGO with specialised 
expertise and activities on gender equality at work. In principle, the absence of a 
specialised women’s group might be compensated with societal mobilisation through 
women’s sections in trade unions, which are relatively strong in Slovenia compared to
other countries in the region. However, gender equality is generally not one of the main 
concerns for unions in East Central Europe.  
Table 4 summarises the settings of the three explanatory factors discussed in this section. 
Table 4 about here 
4. Compliance outcomes: transposition and equality institutions in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovenia  
This section provides a brief overview of the transposition of the Equal Pay and Equal 
Treatment directives in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovenia, as well as of 
the enforcement capacities of the equality bodies that these countries have established. It draws 
on interviews conducted with representatives from women’s groups, women’s sections in trade 
unions, equality bodies and government departments, and independent gender equality experts 
in the four countries, but refers to secondary sources wherever possible. The overview shows 
that transposition is generally good, although there are some shortcomings in all countries. 
Especially if the equality bodies are taken into account, a broad comparative assessment 
suggests that Lithuania, Slovenia, and Hungary perform better than the Czech Republic, 
mainly due to shortcomings with regard to the equality body. At the same time, the 
performance did generally not differ between pre- and post-accession. 
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The Czech Republic did not establish one single legal act to transpose EU legislation on 
gender equality in employment. Instead, transposition is fragmented through numerous 
amendments of several laws that affect equal treatment in employment. The key legal changes 
were two amendments to the Labour Code in 2000 and 2004 and elements of the Employment 
Act of 2004 (see also Havelkova 2006: 300-03; Falkner, Treib, and Holzleithner 2008: 41-43). 
Transposition has a number of shortcomings. Concerning equal pay, for example, the narrow 
definition of remuneration in the Act on Wages excludes a range of financial benefits, and 
although the Labour Code affirms the principle of equal pay, it does not explicitly state ‘for the 
same work and work of equal value’ (Havelkova 2005: 11). Concerning equal treatment, the 
fragmented transposition created inconsistencies (see also Havelkova 2006: 300-01; Falkner, 
Treib, and Holzleithner 2008: 42-3). For example, after the entry into force of amendments to 
the State Service Act and the Military Service Act was postponed, the employees concerned 
were not covered by equal treatment provisions. Definitions of sexual harassment in the 
Labour Code, Employment Act, and Military Service act differ, and none corresponds to the 
2002 amendment of the Equal Treatment directive. Discriminatory prohibitions in the Labour 
Code remain, such as of underground work for women (based on an ILO Convention that is 
incompatible with the acquis, but can only be repealed every 10 years). Access to self-
employment is not covered, nor the right of associations to engage in judicial procedures in 
support of victims. The shortcomings led the government to propose a new Anti-discrimination 
Act, which was passed by the Chamber of Deputies, but rejected by the Senate in 2006 
(although primarily in opposition to other non-discrimination grounds than gender), and the 
lower House failed to obtain the necessary majority to overturn the veto.  
The equality institutions are rather weak, with limited competences and arguably lacking 
independence (Koldinská 2005: 12). The Government Council for Equal Opportunities for 
Women and Men, created in 2001, is not a permanent institution, but a forum for regular 
meetings of representatives of government ministries, gender NGOs, and the social partners. It 
is a consultative council with only advisory functions (recommendations; policy coordination 
across ministries) and does not engage in monitoring and enforcement, nor does it provide 
independent support for victims. It is supported by a unit in the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs with limited autonomy and a small staff. The work of the Gender Equality Unit 
consists primarily of the publication of an annual report on the government’s programme and 
activities on gender equality. In sum, in both pre- and post-accession there are important 
shortcomings with transposition and the equality body is rather weak.  
4.2. Hungary  
Initially, the transposition process in Hungary was also rather fragmented. Pre-accession 
alignment consisted of piece-meal amendments of various laws affected by EU gender equality
acquis and was completed with an amendment of the Labour Code in 2001. The approach 
changed after the centre-left won the election in 2002. A comprehensive Act on Equal
Treatment and Promotion of Equal Opportunities was passed by parliament in December 2003 
and entered into force in January 2004. The Act does not only cover gender equality but also 
discrimination on other grounds, including race, ethnicity, religious belief, disability, age, and 
sexual orientation.  
The Equal Treatment Act is generally well developed and progressive (see also Falkner, Treib, 
and Holzleithner 2008: 79; Krizsan and Pap 2005; Krizsan 2009). Still, some shortcomings 
with regard to gender equality remain. One reason is the government’s desire to treat all 
grounds of discrimination equally, rather than treating gender as a special case, not least since 
gender discrimination in Hungary is perceived as less salient than racial discrimination –
especially of the Roman minority. As a result, sexual harassment is not explicitly prohibited. 
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the general prohibition of harassment. This argument neglects that sexual harassment does not 
only concern harassment on the ground of a person’s gender, but also of a sexual nature. 
Another shortcoming is that the burden of proof is more onerous than intended by Directive 
2002/73. Plaintiffs have to prove that they have ‘suffered a disadvantage’, rather than just 
provide facts that suggest that discrimination may have happened (Falkner, Treib, and 
Holzleithner 2008: 78; Krizsan and Pap 2005: 12).  
The equality body created through the Equal Treatment Act – the Equal Treatment Authority –
is comparatively powerful, with more competences than required by Directive 2002/73, 
especially in the area of enforcement. It can investigate claims ex officio and initiate lawsuits –
also in parallel to the labour court – that can lead to the imposition of fines. As the Authority
covers all discrimination grounds, women’s groups criticise the comparatively weak 
representation of gender discrimination (see also Krizsan 2009 this issue). Indeed, although the 
Authority has adjudicated an increasing number of cases after it started operating in 2005, only 
few concerned gender discrimination (Kollonay-Lehoczky 2005: 24). Concerns for its 
autonomy were raised by the transfer of its budget from an independent chapter into a sub-
heading within the Ministry for Youth, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.  
In sum, notwithstanding comparatively minor shortcomings, the transposition of Equal Pay 
and Equal Treatment legislation both in the pre-accession and post-accession period has been 
good. Enforcement capacities through the equality body are also comparatively strong, albeit 
concerns that gender equality does not have equal importance as other grounds of 
discrimination.  
4.3. Lithuania  
Lithuania was the first among the new member states to pass an act on gender equality. The 
Law on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men was adopted in December 1998. Several 
amendments between 2002 and 2005 broadly achieved an alignment with EU gender equality 
legislation, but certain specific problems remained. These include clarifications in the 
definitions of sexual harassment and direct discrimination, the inclusion of access to self-
employment and professional organisations, or the right of associations to engage in judicial 
procedures in support of victims of discrimination (Davulis 2005: 35-36; Mackeviciute 2005: 
13-14). With regard to equal pay, the law on Equal Opportunities refers only to ‘equal work’, 
rather than ‘work of equal value’ (in contrast to the official English translation).  
The equality body is a fairly strong, autonomous enforcement institution. The Office of the 
Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson was created as early as May 1999. As an independent state 
institution answerable to parliament it has considerable autonomy. Its enforcement powers 
include the investigation of complaints, including anonymous complaints and on its own 
initiative. During an investigation, its requests for information and documentation are binding. 
If it concludes that discrimination has taken place, it can imposed administrative sanctions, 
make recommendations to discontinue discriminatory practices, or refer the material to other 
investigative bodies. It can also provide legal advice to victims, but not legal representation in 
judicial procedures. The 2003 Act on Equal Treatment that introduced a general anti-
discrimination bill expanded its mandate to other grounds of discrimination, but through its 
legacy as a gender equality institution, this has remained a strong focus.  
In sum, although a number of shortcomings with regard to the transposition of specific 
provisions occurred both pre- and post-accession, its broader pattern is satisfactory. The 
equality body has long-standing expertise in gender equality, and considerable enforcement 
powers and autonomy.  
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The Employment Relationships Act passed in 2002 already includes a general prohibition of 
discrimination and sexual harassment, as well as provisions for equal pay for work of equal 
value. The two main acts transposing EU gender equal treatment legislation are the 2002 Act 
on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, and the 2004 Act on the Implementation of the 
Principle of Equal Treatment. The remaining shortcomings are rather specific, relating to 
clarifications on pregnancy and maternity within the definitions of discrimination, and to the 
definition of sexual harassment (Koderman-Sever 2005: 53).  
The equality body is comparatively strong and has long-standing experience in promoting 
gender equality. The Government Office for Equal Opportunities, an independent government 
body, was formally established in 2001, but originated in 1992 as the Office of Women’s 
Policy. Enforcement within the Office is primarily carried out by the Advocate for Equal 
Opportunities for Men and Women. The Advocate investigates complaints, including 
anonymous complaints. If s/he concludes that discrimination has taken place, the Advocate can 
recommend measures to rectify it and request to be notified of such measures. If the offending 
party does not comply with the recommendations, the Advocate can refer the case to other 
investigative bodies, such as the labour inspectorate.  
In sum, gender equality legislation is generally well transposed in Slovenia. The equality body 
has independence, long-standing experience in promoting gender equality, and significant 
enforcement capacities, even if it cannot impose sanctions.  
A broad comparison of the four countries (see Table 5) shows that transposition and 
enforcement capacities through the equality body are generally well developed in Hungary, 
Lithuania, and Slovenia, but both of these aspects of compliance are rather problematic in the 
Czech Republic, both during the pre-accession period and after accession. In the countries with
a positive record, there is no significant deterioration in the post-accession period compared to 
pre-accession.  
Table 5 about here 
5. Explaining cross-case variation in compliance outcomes  
5.1. QCA results for the main explanatory conditions  
This section conducts a crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) (Ragin 1987) in 
order to explain the different outcomes across the countries. Table 6 presents the raw data with 
regard to the configuration of explanatory conditions and outcomes for the eight cases. In 
contrast to fuzzy-set QCA, csQCA only distinguishes whether or not a case has membership in
the set of cases that share a causal condition (or outcome), but not between different degrees of 
membership in these sets. In Table 6, the number 1 expresses membership in the set, while a 0
expresses the absence of membership (note the difference between membership in the set of 
countries that do not have high adjustment costs and those with low adjustment costs). Table 7
presents the same data in a ‘truth table’ of all eight logically possible constellations of the three 
conditions. Two of these constellations are not empirically observed among the cases analysed 
in this paper. The corresponding truth table rows therefore remain empty (while two of the 
constellations fit two cases each).  
Table 6 about here 
Table 7 about here
© 2009 by Ulrich Sedelmeier
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-023a.htm 11Using Boolean algebra, a minimisation of the results for the constellations that share the 
outcome ‘compliance’ yields two equifinal explanations, or causal paths to compliance(2): 
either the absence of high adjustment costs, or a strong left government in combination with
specialised interest groups (solution without any simplifying assumptions about the
unobserved cases). The first path covers the case of post-accession in Hungary, as well as pre-
and post-accession in both Lithuania and Slovenia. The second path covers post-accession in 
Lithuania, and both periods in Hungary. None of the three explanatory factors are by 
themselves necessary conditions.  
How plausible are these results? The result that the absence of high adjustment costs is a 
sufficient condition fits well with the findings of other studies on the EU’s impact on 
candidates/member states (see e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). However, in the 
area of gender equality policy this finding might appear more problematic: companies do not 
usually lobby against gender equality legislation, despite the potential costs involved. The 
difficulty to quantify the costs is a disincentive to lobbying, especially since a more effective 
way to minimise the adjustment costs is to flout equality legislation in practice, as long as the 
risk of court cases and sanctions is low. Indeed, concerns about costs have not generally 
figured prominently in opposition to equality legislation. The finding that adjustment costs 
matter is nonetheless not necessarily just a spurious correlation. The financial implications 
were the main reason for the postponement for over two years of the entry into force of the 
Czech State Service Act and Military Service Act containing non-discrimination provisions 
(Havelkova 2006: 300).  
The explanation of a combination of strong left governments and specialised interest groups is 
not only logically plausible; its causal relevance is also confirmed by a closer analysis of the 
cases. Social democratic governments are more likely to take gender equality seriously, and 
more willing to endow equality bodies with enforcement capacity, but they need sufficient 
support in parliament to implement these changes. For example, key changes in Hungary were 
only carried out after the centre-left replaced the centre right government in 2002. In the Czech
Republic, the social democratic party lacked the strength to pass a more comprehensive anti-
discrimination act. Women’s groups by themselves are not sufficiently strong to push through 
changes against unfavourable governments. At the same time, favourably disposed and 
sufficiently strong government as such might also not be enough for correct transposition and 
equality bodies with adequate enforcement capacities. These might only be achieved if willing 
governments can draw on the specialist expertise of NGOs.  
5.2. Alternative explanations  
In view of the limited number of cases, this paper’s in-depth analysis has focused on three 
explanatory conditions that appear particular salient. This sub-section considers additional 
explanatory factors in order to ascertain whether this selection can be justified or whether the 
findings are biased due to the neglect of other plausible factors.  
Key explanatory factors at the EU level concern the strength of the external incentives 
(granting/withholding membership prior to accession; fines by the European Court of Justice 
after accession) as well as the intensity of EU monitoring after accession, which increases the 
likelihood that non-compliance is detected. With regard to the latter, we are more likely to find 
variation across issue areas, but not across countries within the area of gender equality. With 
regard to external incentives, of course the starting point of the paper was the question whether 
the changing incentive structure after accession has a negative effect on compliance. At first 
glance, the findings of this paper appear to reject the importance of external incentives for 
domestic compliance: the changing incentive structure did not matter for compliance in 
Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia; and even prior to accession, the potential threat of 
withholding membership did not lead to compliance in the Czech Republic. Instead, domestic 
conditions seem to trump external incentives.  
However, first, such a reading neglects that an ‘external incentive’ model of domestic change 
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might change governments cost/benefit calculations – depending both on the size and 
credibility of the benefits offered by the EU and on the size of domestic costs (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier 2004: 664). The lack of compliance in the Czech case fits the explanation that 
EU incentives (or rather the threat of withholding incentives) in the area of social policy were 
not sufficiently credible, due to mixed signals from EU actors (Sissenich 2007), to trump 
unfavourable domestic conditions. Second, although the cases of pre-accession compliance 
required favourable domestic conditions, it would be difficult to explain the changes in 
equality policies without the demands made by the EU. Domestic changes in equality policy 
and institutions in each of the three cases (as well as the more limited changes in the Czech 
Republic) were triggered by adjustment pressure from the EU. Thus, in terms of the 
explanatory power of external incentives, the paper confirms that when these face problems of 
credibility, favourable domestic conditions were necessary for domestic compliance with EU 
legislation. Moreover, a key finding of the paper is indeed that the changing incentive structure 
after accession as such does not necessarily lead to a deterioration of compliance.  
An explanatory factor drawn from constructivist approaches to the domestic impact of 
international institutions is the extent to which international rules resonate positively with 
domestic rules or political culture more broadly (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 668). 
As mentioned earlier, the widespread perception that equality between men and women had 
been achieved already under communism led to a lack of positive domestic resonance of EU 
gender equality policies. This perception undermines arguments that gender discrimination is a 
salient issue in post-communism, while communism left traditional gender stereotypes and 
role perceptions with regard to work and family intact. While the lack of positive resonance 
can be considered a general obstacle to compliance across post-communist new members, 
currently available data does not lend itself easily to establish clear variation across countries, 
which might explain differences in outcomes.  
Administrative capacities are an explanatory factor generally emphasised in compliance 
studies (Tallberg 2002; Treib 2008). More recently some studies have suggested to focus more 
specifically on the coordinating mechanisms – the administrative and legislative arrangements 
– for the implementation of the acquis (Dimitrova and Toshkov 2009 this issue; Sedelmeier 
2008: 820-1; Zubek forthcoming). These macro-mechanisms might be more suitable to 
explaining aggregate cross-national differences in compliance patterns, while as explanations 
for issue-specific variation across countries coordination is more likely to interact with other 
factors. Indeed, Dimitrova and Toshkov (2009) suggest that it only facilitates transposition in 
the absence of political opposition – which in turn can be considered to depend precisely on 
factors that this paper has focused on, such as government partisan preferences and domestic 
adjustment costs. While at first glance the effectiveness of national coordination appears a 
sufficient condition for compliance – among the four countries, only in the Czech Republic is
the coordination mechanisms weak (Verheijen 2007: 26) – a closer analysis refutes this 
interpretation (apart from the methodological problem that we only have data for 2006). For 
example, in Hungary, the most significant changes were related to the change in government in 
2002, not to a change in coordination mechanisms; the lack of compliance in the Czech case 
remained largely due to political opposition among the centre-right parties, rather than the 
weak administrative coordination.  
6. Conclusions  
Does compliance with EU law in the new member states deteriorate after they have achieved 
accession? This paper provides a preliminary answer based on an analysis of the transposition 
of EU gender equality legislation – in particular equal pay and equal treatment at the 
workplace – and of the enforcement capacities of equality bodies in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovenia. The analysis suggests that despite the decline in the 
sanctioning power of EU institutions, there is no significant deterioration in the post-accession 
period compared to the pre-accession period. The Czech Republic had transposition problems
and the equality body lacked enforcement capacities both before and after accession. 
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member states), but in broader terms, it is adequate, and the equality bodies have considerable 
enforcement capacities – again, both before and after accession.  
The paper also makes a first step towards explaining these differences in outcomes across the 
four countries (and time periods). The results of a csQCA suggest two different causal paths 
that can lead to broadly ad equate transposition and strong equality bodies. One is the absence 
of high adjustment costs, even if businesses do not usually lobby strongly against the adoption 
of equality legislation. The other path to compliance is the combination of strong social 
democratic governments and NGOs specialising in EU gender equality legislation. Neither is 
sufficient by itself. NGOs are powerless when faced with unfavourable governments. 
Conversely, even favourable governments need the expertise and support of NGOs to devise 
adequate legislation and equality bodies.  
In terms of the study of the role of the incentives that international institutions provide for 
domestic compliance with their rules, this paper does not challenge the argument that such 
international incentives are a necessary part of an explanation for compliance in post-
communist Europe. However, with regard to pre-accession compliance, it confirms that such 
incentives (i.e. the positive incentive of a credible promise of membership) have to be 
combined with favourable domestic conditions. With regard to post-accession, the paper’s 
findings suggest that the weakening of such incentives (the threat of financial sanctions 
through the ECJ and the reputational costs associated with infringement procedures, rather 
than the pre-accession threat of withholding membership altogether) as such does not
necessary lead to a deterioration of compliance if domestic conditions are favourable. 
Further research in this area will need to take account of the application of legislation for the 
assessment of compliance. First studies in this vein argue that there is a gap between good 
transposition and problems with application (Falkner and Treib 2008; Falkner, Treib, and 
Holzleithner 2008). One challenge is to go beyond a more general acknowledgement of the 
existence of application problems towards an operationalisation that lends itself to establish 
variation in the nature and extent of such problems (and subsequently to explain them). 
Moreover, such studies should also include the old member states in order to analyse to what 
extent the gap between transposition and application is characteristic of post-accession 
compliance patterns or of this particular issue area.  
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(*) Research for this paper was supported by a Marie Curie Fellowship, grant MEIF-CT-2005-514104. For 
helpful comments, I would like to thank Gerda Falkner, Klaudijus Maniokas, and two anonymous referees.  
(1) A broad range of factors matter for correct application of legislation. They include the authority of 
institutions mandated to promote specifically the implementation of workplace equality legislation, such the 
equality bodies (arguably, they can also matter for formal compliance if a body established at t0 mobilises for 
correct formal transposition of equality legislation at t1), or labour law more generally (such as Labour 
Inspectorates). Another set of factors affects the likelihood that victims of discrimination attempt to, and are 
able to, claim their rights, such as the working of the legal system (trust in it; expertise; existence of 
specialised industrial tribunals and Employment Appeals Tribunals; speed of proceedings; case law; etc.); 
beneficiaries’ information about their rights; and unemployment levels.  
(2) As QCA does not assume causal symmetry, usually a separate analysis for the outcome ‘non-compliance’
should be conducted. In view of the limited number of cases with the outcome ‘non-compliance’ in the 
sample, the results of such an analysis might not be particularly useful. 
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Czech 
Republic  Hungary  Lithuania  Slovenia 
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
Parliamentary seats 
(%)  
mean  
2 best years  
               
36,3 35.7 38.5 46.8 24.1 49.7 27.8 43.3
37 36 46.1 47.2 36.2 49.7 27.8 43.3
Years of dominance in 
majority government  0 0 2 (1.7) 3 0 2 0 2
Strong left 
government?  No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
EU average Czech Republic Hungary Lithuania Slovenia
1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004
16 15 22 19 21 11 16 16 14 9
High adjustment costs? Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
Czech Republic  Hungary  Lithuania  Slovenia 
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
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Table 5: Compliance outcomes (transposition and enforcement bodies) 
  
Table 6: Configuration of explanatory conditions and outcomes 
  
  
  
Czech Republic  Hungary  Lithuania  Slovenia 
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
Strong left 
government  No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
High adjustment 
costs  Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
Specialised 
NGOs  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Czech 
Republic  Hungary  Lithuania  Slovenia 
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
1998-
2003
2004-
2006
Broadly correct 
transposition and capable 
enforcement bodies? 
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cases
not high  
adjustment 
 
costs
strong left 
government
specialised 
 
interest 
groups
compliance 
(transposition/
enforcement)
CZ (pre-acc.) 0 0 1 0
CZ (post-acc.) 0 0 1 0
HU (pre-acc.) 0 1 1 1
HU (post-acc.) 1 1 1 1
LT (pre-acc.) 1 0 1 1
LT (post-acc.) 1 1 1 1
SI (pre-acc.) 1 0 0 1
SI (post-acc.) 1 1 0 1
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not high  
adjustment 
 
costs
strong left 
government
specialised 
 
interest 
groups
compliance 
(transposition/
enforcement)
cases
0 0 0 (no cases)  
0 0 1 0 CZ (pre-acc.); 
CZ (post-acc.)
0 1 0 (no cases)  
0 1 1 1 HU (pre-acc.)
1 0 0 1 SI (pre-acc.)
1 0 1 1 LT (pre-acc.)
1 1 0 1 SI (post-acc.)
1 1 1 1
HU (post-acc.); 
 
LT (post-acc.)
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